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Negotiating the Ideal Deal
Which Local Governments Have 
the Most Bargaining Leverage?
Rachel Weber
University of Illinois at Chicago
It is easy to criticize local governments’ use of fi nancial incentives 
for business retention and attraction. Critics say that incentives cost 
more than the public benefi ts they create and redirect monies from other 
important public goods like infrastructure and education. They argue 
that incentives poison interjurisdictional relations, contribute to sprawl, 
favor large businesses over small, strain the planning capacity of local 
government, and are subject to the worst kinds of cronyism and abuse 
(for an inventory of such abuses, see LeRoy [2005]). 
However, calls for both federal legislation that could eliminate the 
practice of incentives (Burstein and Rolnick 1994) and regional truces 
that could reduce their use have been largely ignored. Public offi cials 
and fi scal watchdogs alike admit that, despite their general distaste for 
incentives and the competitive interjurisdictional relations they have 
created, such programs are diffi cult to condemn across the board. In-
centives, along with zoning and land use regulations, are one of the few 
sources of leverage that local governments possess in their negotiations 
with developers and businesses. 
Local governments use these economic development tools in dif-
ferent ways and to different effect. Whereas some jurisdictions are held 
hostage to demands of businesses and sign off on expensive long-term 
commitments, other states and cities negotiate better agreements. Some 
local governments have used incentives strategically to infl uence both 
the site-location decision as well as the magnitude of private invest-
ment. These dealmakers absorb relatively little risk and commit rela-
tively little up-front investment in relation to the public benefi ts created. 
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In other cases, however, “subsidy programs and deals have become so 
astronomically expensive that they can only be fairly described as ‘soak 
the taxpayer’ scams” (LeRoy 2005, p. 34). Anecdotes of states and cit-
ies spending (or foregoing tax revenues) upwards of $500,000 per job 
created abound.
What is a “good deal” from the public sector’s perspective, and why 
do some states and cities craft better deals than others? This chapter 
provides some insight into the context in which the public sector and 
private business negotiate agreements; it also describes the elements 
of a well-designed deal from the public sector’s perspective.1 The fi -
nal section identifi es the different sources of bargaining leverage from 
which local governments and business draw in order to partially explain 
the observed variation in deal structure. 
BARGAINING ENVIRONMENT
Regulatory Context
Development incentives and regulatory environments matter less 
to businesses when deciding between distinct regions of the country. 
Proximity to key markets and suppliers, labor and transportation costs, 
and the whims of corporate executives are more important at this stage. 
Once the business has narrowed its choice of location to a particular 
region, however, it begins to consider the tax burden and physical 
characteristics of potential sites. The site location decision could be a 
relatively private affair, whereby the company purchases land, hires a 
developer and employees, and pays whatever taxes are levied on its 
property, employees, sales, and income. Aside from obtaining the req-
uisite building permits and complying with existing zoning and envi-
ronmental regulations, the business could have little direct contact with 
the public sector.
Protracted negotiations ensue only if expectations are raised, that is, 
either the business wants something more from local government, or the 
local government wants something more from business. What exactly 
comprises more is contested because public and private responsibilities 
in economic development are not fi xed and unchanging. The principle, 
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for example, that a city should not be responsible for the development 
costs of individual businesses (because this falls squarely within some 
kind of proprietary private realm of responsibility) is diffi cult to sup-
port given the historical reality of public assistance for business. The 
courts have tried to resolve the issue by requiring local governments to 
document and prove the “public purpose” inherent in every act of tar-
geted assistance (Schoettle 2003). But 200 years of incentive use in the 
United States have stretched the public purpose doctrine beyond recog-
nition, blurring the boundaries of public and private roles and making 
it impossible to defer to principle or precedent (Sbragia 1996). Every 
case, therefore, must be negotiated on its own merits.
State governments have historically limited city taxing and spend-
ing power to curtail the cronyism, wasteful expenditures, uncontrolled 
borrowing, and general profl igacy associated with municipal fi nancial 
governance (Frug 1980). But they have also authorized municipalities 
to engage in development negotiations and, beyond an initial grant of 
authority, have often provided little to no guidance to them in terms of 
what to offer and expect from subsidized businesses (Briffault 1997). 
Even within the same state, local governments lack uniform criteria for 
allocating funds toward business attraction and retention. The varia-
tion in deal structure reveals multiple local economic development “re-
gimes” and cultures that have evolved over time, with little interference 
from higher orders of government.
Depending on one’s perspective, this reliance on negotiated strat-
egies at lower levels of government is either the result of a historic 
oversight, whereby such practices had become entrenched before they 
could be regulated, or the intentional by-product of a federalist system 
of governance. Cities and states have fought to preserve their autonomy 
from higher levels of government and have, in the case of economic de-
velopment, exhibited a preference for more informal and decentralized 
strategies. The economic theory of jurisdictional competition advanced 
by Tiebout (1956) and developed by Peterson (1981) provide post facto 
support for this kind of decentralization by arguing that a combination 
of independence in public strategy and choice in private location deci-
sion will lead to regulatory outcomes that are aligned with citizen pref-
erences in a dynamic equilibrium. 
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Interests
Businesses and governments are not likely to agree on what con-
stitutes the “ideal deal” due to the confl icting nature of their interests. 
Business wants to maximize profi ts, and can best do so when local gov-
ernments agree to absorb risks and pay for costs that the business would 
otherwise shoulder (e.g., taxes, infrastructure, job training). Public in-
terests are more complex, broad, and diffuse: improving the general 
welfare of citizens through the provision of tax-funded services.2 Public 
offi cials can achieve this objective if they strengthen their economic 
base (retaining and attracting business) with minimal expenditure. Be-
cause strengthening an economic base is a formidable and unmanage-
able goal, public economic development practitioners tend to “shoot 
low” and focus their efforts on a tangible outcome: attracting businesses 
to their locale (Rubin 1988). 
While it may initially appear that one party’s benefi t is always the 
other’s burden, a gray area exists where mutual gains may be had. This 
is because public and private interests are interdependent: both parties 
need the other in order to attain their objectives. Businesses rely on a 
public service infrastructure, property security, and a stable business en-
vironment whereas governments depend on tax revenues, employment, 
indirect and induced spending, and the physical development business-
es provide. A deal that allows a fi rm to add more staff will help it to 
grow to meet increasing demand for its products while a municipality in 
need of jobs for its un- or underemployed population also values these 
jobs. The notion of a “spillover effect” captures and complicates the 
interdependence of public and private interests. Development subsidies 
selectively mitigate some of the costs of doing business for individual 
fi rms, but advocates contend that assisting individual projects will lead 
to areawide improvements and the sharing of public benefi ts. 
Deal structure depends on both parties’ ability to persuade the other 
that their interests are symbiotic and served equally well by the agree-
ment. If a business is able to convince local governments that their in-
terests overlap entirely (“what’s good for General Motors is good for 
Detroit”), governments may be excessively accommodating and assume 
many of the costs of private land development and infrastructure. If a 
municipality can convince a business that it is getting a special deal on 
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land in an up-and-coming inner-city neighborhood, that business is less 
likely to demand generous tax incentives.
Power
Despite their interdependence, local governments and businesses 
do not always negotiate on equal footing. Local governments are handi-
capped by the fact that they are embedded in space and not footloose 
like business. Because they are constrained by interjurisdictional com-
petition for private investment, public entities are dependent on private 
business to pay for basic services and infrastructure (Peterson 1981). 
They may be more likely to offer compromises so that deals end closer 
to the business’ initial proposal.
Businesses are also better able to control critical information fl ows 
during negotiations (Markusen and Nesse 2007). The fi nancial gap com-
panies seek to fi ll to make a project feasible may be much smaller than 
they would have the public sector believe. Business tries to assure local 
governments that the deal would not take place without public assis-
tance (the “but for” condition) (Persky, Felsenstein, and Wiewel 1997). 
However, they can also bluff about the other sites they are considering 
and demand more than is really necessary because management has 
access to relevant information about the fi rm’s own cost structure and 
hurdle rates to which local governments are not privy (LeRoy 2005; 
Weber 2002). Government agencies never know the extent to which the 
business is serious about selecting a location; even if the business has 
made up its mind, it does better to keep the local government nervously 
anticipating a change of heart. 
Moreover, the private sector starts from an organizational advan-
tage. Local governments often lack fl exibility; in order for public ad-
ministrators to change their initial offers of infrastructure provision, for 
example, they often have to go back to their city councils or legislatures 
and engage in a time-consuming process of backroom lobbying (Ru-
bin 1988). Even though local offi cials try to limit the range of interest 
groups who can participate in the debate over these issues, community 
organizations, labor unions, and watchdog groups may try to expose the 
terms of the deals and insist on protracted public discussion. In contrast, 
most corporate offi cials control information and negotiate in a bare-
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knuckled manner, hire consultants and lawyers to help them do so, and 
rely on internal decision-making structures for expedited action. 
Local governments have only recently learned how important good 
negotiation skills are to protecting their interests. They are subjecting 
their spending on economic development to more scrutiny and rely-
ing on more accountable forms of assistance by looking to the legal 
framework that governs the performance of private sector contracts for 
guidance. This changed behavior is not the result of some enlightened 
attitude—with fewer own-source funds, fewer intergovernmental trans-
fers, and increased community outrage at “corporate welfare,” cities 
have to been forced to be more selective about the businesses and proj-
ect expenses they fi nance.
WHAT IS A GOOD DEAL FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR?
In many ways, the quality of a deal can only be evaluated post facto. 
Did the local government get what it wanted (business retention, jobs, 
tax revenues) without paying “too much”? At a minimum, the marginal 
benefi ts should equal or exceed the marginal costs (including any fore-
gone revenues and additional costs associated with the development) 
after a reasonable period of time (Bartik 1991; Ledebur and Woodward 
1990). But local governments may not have to wait years to evaluate 
the quality of their deals. Even before the ink has dried and the deal is 
cut, certain kinds of incentive design are more likely to lead to better 
outcomes for the public sector.3 In such deals, the benefi ts and burdens 
of public fi nancing are more fairly calibrated, contractual safeguards 
exist to help governments manage risks, and relevant information is 
disclosed.4
Ex Ante Decision Analysis
Local governments should have some idea of what they want out of 
a deal before negotiations even begin. Contracts that rely on very loose 
parameters of fulfi llment are considered “incomplete” and provide par-
ties with opportunities to exploit gaps. The state of Minnesota, for ex-
ample, requires all state agencies and municipalities to develop explicit 
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benchmarks for awarding subsidies.5 These public purpose benchmarks 
include standards for job creation as well as for the wages of any new 
jobs. Job retention is only considered a legitimate criterion “where job 
loss is imminent and demonstrable.” The law requires each incentive-
granting agency to submit their benchmarks to the state’s Department 
of Employment and Economic Development and for the department to 
publish them annually.
With a better sense of their bargaining goals, local governments can 
better evaluate the costs and benefi ts of their subsidy programs. Few 
cities and states actually know the real cost of what they are giving 
away or what they are getting in return. In a survey of local economic 
development practitioners, only 24 percent reported any systematic or 
quantitative means of analyzing deals (Reese 1993). By comparing the 
present value of anticipated public costs (e.g., foregone revenues and 
additional expenditures on services, such as schools and infrastructure) 
to the present value of expected benefi ts (e.g., increased jobs, revenues 
generated by salaries of new employees, and multiplier effects) ex ante, 
standard methods of cost-benefi t analysis can provide a ballpark esti-
mate of how much the public benefi ts will cost. The more intangible de-
sign amenities, real estate improvements, and environmental mitigation 
may be valued by comparing them to their market equivalents.
Performance Standards
Local government can make their assistance to private business 
conditional by including legally binding provisions in the contracts that 
specify public benefi t projections. For example, business may have to 
commit to creating a certain number of jobs, not relocating within a 
specifi ed time period, and compliance with higher environmental or 
design standards. Many state statutes now require contracts to specify 
a particular wage rate, often based on a percentage of the federal mini-
mum wage or regional averages (see Purinton [2003] for an inventory 
of jobs standards). Contracts may also stipulate that businesses provide 
health care benefi ts to the new or retained employees. 
The contractual agreement can specify a reasonable time period for 
which the business must maintain operations in the locality or create 
a certain amount of jobs in exchange for its assistance. A Connecticut 
statute governing a below-market rate loan program states that “Busi-
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ness is prohibited from relocating during the term the loan is outstand-
ing or for 10 years after receiving assistance, whichever is longer.”6 
Without a so-called “benefi t period,” a subsidized company will have 
an indefi nite amount of time in which to fulfi ll its promises.
At the same time, savvy governments are not excessively rigid in 
their attempts to embed capital; they understand that it can be diffi cult 
to hold fi rms to their promises about the future given the vagaries of 
the global economy (Weber 2002). Corporate managers make location 
decisions in the context of great uncertainties and attempt to rein in the 
factors they can control: debt levels, capital spending, overhead, and 
staffi ng—all of which infl uence the places where they locate.
Local administrators are left with the challenge of protecting their 
assets while anticipating the uncertainties inherent in a turbulent busi-
ness environment. They do this by designing incentives that calibrate 
the number of jobs or investment to a subsidy ex post and by making 
investments in places, as opposed to individual fi rms. Unlike an out-
right grant of funds, performance-based programs provide no assistance 
to a company until it meets specifi ed levels of performance. For ex-
ample, a fi rm receives an income tax benefi t once it has hired a certain 
number of workers at a designated minimum wage. The incentive can 
increase as the number of employees hired grows. The $2.5 million in-
centive package negotiated between Bismarck, North Dakota, and Cov-
entry Healthcare contained a provision whereby the company agreed 
to receive progressively larger payments for the subsequent phases or 
groups of employees hired (Hanson 2002). The city waited to make its 
largest payment until the fi nal group had been hired.
This kind of payment clause protects the jurisdiction’s investment 
in case the company encounters setbacks or falls behind in its hiring 
schedule. Performance-based incentives may be less popular with busi-
nesses, as they typically prefer to receive lump sum payments to cover 
development and other start-up costs. With proper monitoring, how-
ever, they are easier for the public sector to enforce and respond better 
to unforeseen exigencies.
Enforcement Mechanisms
Spending time and effort to write detailed contracts and then ig-
noring the subsidized businesses after funds have “changed hands” is 
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not an effective economic development strategy. If businesses do not 
comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement as stated, they 
may have “breached” their contracts. Some contracts include a notice 
provision to inform the municipality of any changes in the operations 
of the business, such as the initiation of any lawsuits or bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, which might adversely impact the subsidized project. 
In other cases, the public sector must devise monitoring require-
ments. Local governments typically include one of two types of moni-
toring techniques. The fi rst type places the onus of oversight on the 
public sector but requires that specifi ed documents be available for pub-
lic inspection and audit. A more effective type of provision creates an 
affi rmative obligation on the part of the business to provide necessary 
information rather than to merely allow local governments to ask for 
the right of inspection. Kansas City, for example, double checks self-re-
ported data from fi rms against information derived from the city’s em-
ployee earnings tax (Weber 2002). Companies are given a grace period 
of about two to three years to meet the specifi ed standards.
Penalties are less important when municipalities use performance-
based incentives from the start. If a state or city withholds funds until 
the recipient company has demonstrated that it has lived up to its obli-
gation, there is no need to recapture funds because of nonperformance 
further down the road. 
If public funds do change hands up front, however, nonperformance 
provisions, remedies, and damages should be written into the contract. 
These provisions generally fall into fi ve categories (Ledebur and Wood-
ward 1990):
 1) Recisions: canceling a subsidy agreement if job and revenue 
projections are not met.
 2) Clawbacks: recovery of all or part of subsidy costs if perfor-
mance goals are not met.
 3) Recalibrations: adjustment of subsidy to refl ect changing 
business conditions.
 4) Penalties: additional charges (e.g., the interest accrued on the 
public’s investment) for nonperformance or relocation.
 5) Debarment and suspension: prohibiting the noncompliant 
company from receiving incentives in the future. 
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A written contract should represent the complete understanding be-
tween parties because informal promises do not hold up well in court. 
If accountability mechanisms are clear, reasonable, and obvious from 
the start of negotiations, fi rms may voluntarily repay the incentive if 
they renege on their promises, obviating the need for any formal legal 
enforcement.7 In 2003, for example, Philips Semiconductor honored its 
clawback agreement by paying back $13.1 million in tax breaks to the 
City of Albuquerque, New Mexico, after it closed its plant. United Air-
lines agreed to pay back almost $32 million in prorated clawback fi nes 
(of the $300 million in tax breaks it had received from Indiana govern-
ment agencies) after it failed to live up to its promise to invest $800 mil-
lion by 2001 (Wall Street Journal 2002). Accountability mechanisms 
reduce the uncertainty and potential for arbitrary behavior that plague 
incentives on both sides of the bargaining table. 
WHAT KINDS OF GOVERNMENTS NEGOTIATE 
GOOD DEALS?
Nonetheless, many local governments continue to fear that the 
above-mentioned contractual mechanisms will lower the value of the 
incentive for the business if the business perceives future tussles with 
the law, a lack of fl exibility on the part of the public sector, and addi-
tional reporting requirements and compliance costs. Many states and 
cities resist the use of the contractual protections mentioned above and 
enter into deals where they accept the bulk of project risks for little 
return. When the state of West Virginia loaned over $64 million to An-
chor Hocking to help the company keep its plant open and provide jobs 
to its employees, it failed to state these goals in the actual loan docu-
ments. When the company closed its plant, the absence of a specifi c 
goal, coupled with a contractual provision allowing prepayment of the 
loan without penalty, led the court to conclude that the fi rm had satisfi ed 
its obligations by paying off the loan (West Virginia v. Anchor Hocking 
1988). 
Conversely, some governments take a rigid bargaining position, re-
fusing to negotiate altogether or make any concessions. The assumption 
of fundamental interest confl ict (i.e., zero-sum bargaining) underpins 
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the notion that fi rms seek only to extract wealth from the locale and that 
cities try to extract as much as they can from the fi rm. Such adversarial 
assumptions lead local governments to adopt overly protective regula-
tory strategies: for example, exactions on corporations disproportion-
ate to the costs associated with new development. Such behavior may 
discourage business activity. Although perceptions of its impact vary in 
hindsight, the city of Cleveland experienced an investment “strike” fol-
lowing then-Mayor Dennis Kucinich’s refusal to subsidize a large retail 
redevelopment in the absence of a living wage guarantee.
Why do some states and cities negotiate safeguards to manage risks 
and assure performance while others potentially jeopardize their fi scal 
health? Why do others adopt overly demanding and rigid postures? This 
last section seeks to generalize about the features of local governments 
that may infl uence their bargaining leverage. 
Leverage implies some situational advantage—those who have it 
have less to lose if the deal falls through. Although space-bound gov-
ernments start off from a bargaining disadvantage, any locality that has 
discretionary power to grant or deny requests for changes in density, tax 
burdens, and zoning has a modicum of bargaining leverage. This is be-
cause property development and industrial relocation offer businesses 
opportunities to increase their profi ts. The subsidies themselves are per-
ceived to be a source of leverage, which is one of the reasons why local 
governments continue to offer them.8 If municipalities had no leverage, 
businesses would have no need to negotiate with them.
However, the more assets particular places possess, the more le-
verage and decisional independence they are likely to acquire. This is 
why those governments with better market positions (relative to their 
competition as potential business locations) appear to have the ability to 
be better negotiators. If the private sector needs the municipality more 
than the municipality needs the business, many of the risks of develop-
ment can be migrated back to the private sector. The shifting of need 
occurs in urban areas that are built-out with relatively little available 
land for development. For example, the attractiveness of Chicago as 
a location for retail development has allowed the city to require that 
developers receive tax increment fi nancing (TIF) incentives on a “pay-
as-you go” basis instead of front-funding subsidies with bond proceeds 
(Weber 2003). Structuring the deal this way means that the developer 
initially pays for the costs of the project and is only reimbursed as the 
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municipality collects the incremental property taxes. This places the 
onus on the developer (to generate new property tax revenues) instead 
of on the municipality (to fl oat bonds secured with the incremental tax 
revenues).
Moreover, in higher income locations with strong tax bases, resi-
dents may prefer slower growth, choosing less congestion over more 
development (Elkins 1995; Goetz 1990). Slow growth measures have 
been adopted by many municipalities (particularly those on the coasts) 
and, in these places, citizens have rejected ballot measures that would 
raise taxes to support new large-scale development. These jurisdictions 
can afford to be selective, either refraining from the practice of offering 
incentives or including extensive public benefi ts requirements in their 
incentive contracts. They can devalue the threats of businesses in favor 
of other political objectives. In contrast, poorer places may have to offer 
more to induce much-needed development and help private investors 
overcome perceived and actual development risks (Rubin and Rubin 
1987).
The desirability of a locale is refl ected in the value of its land. In-
deed, those municipalities with a valuable land inventory (i.e., publicly 
owned properties) are able to extract benefi ts from potential developers 
(Elkins 1995). With the Yerba Buena development in San Francisco and 
California Plaza in Los Angeles, the respective cities took on more risks 
but were able to secure from private developers expensive new cultural 
facilities and public spaces (Sagalyn 1997). They used the power of 
rising land values and a scarcity of developable sites to negotiate for 
additional developer contributions to their ambitious mixed-use proj-
ects. Because of the desirability of these sites, the municipalities crafted 
deals in such a way that the developers were able to achieve their antici-
pated rates of return. Expensive homes provided the tax base needed to 
pay for the bulk of city services so that the overall tax burden on busi-
nesses was not considered so high as to require abatements.
For these reasons, one might expect to see those local governments 
with higher initial levels and rates of growth in a superior bargaining 
position relative to those more desperate for private investment. Indeed, 
jurisdictions such as Berkeley (CA), Westchester County (NY), and 
Cambridge (MA) include public benefi t requirements, such as job qual-
ity standards, in their incentive contracts. These jurisdictions are not as 
concerned about their competition because they know their highly edu-
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cated residents and positive reputations are already a draw for particular 
kinds of business. 
But not all such governments play their (upper) hands. For exam-
ple, New Jersey, a wealthy, high-tax state, just passed a law that would 
allow it to borrow to pay for incentive grants in any year when the 
state legislature does not appropriate the money. A recent report found 
that several high-profi le deals between New York City and businesses 
contained “employment cushions” that allowed companies to lay off 
employees without such actions breaching their contracts (Good Jobs 
First 2004). 
Nor does this rationale explain why many lower-income jurisdic-
tions are proponents of more accountable deal making. Good Jobs First 
lists the 43 states, 41 cities, and 5 counties that attached job quality 
standards to at least one development subsidy (Good Jobs First 2003). 
On this list, many poor, fi scally challenged jurisdictions stick out—De-
troit, St. Louis, and Rochester, to name a few. 
Factors unrelated to the wealth of their residents appear to be at 
play. Elkins (1995) fi nds that more progressive strategies were adopted 
by municipalities with higher unemployment rates. Perhaps, it has been 
argued, some poor municipalities experience such high degrees of po-
litical activism that local governments are pressured into good behavior 
(see, for example, Reese and Rosenfeld [2001]; Elkins [1995]). If this 
is the case, local offi cials there may propose incentives with more com-
munity benefi ts requirements. 
Recent examples of the success of grassroots coalitions in getting 
community benefi ts agreements signed in cities such as Los Angeles and 
Milwaukee attest to the role of third parties in infl uencing government 
behavior (Good Jobs First 2006). In the past decade, a community-based 
movement for corporate accountability has arisen to monitor economic 
development deals and expose incidents of subsidy abuse. These groups 
have organized an increasing number of petition drives and referenda to 
place subsidies and performance measures on local ballots. Their power 
also lies in their ability to raise community awareness of the deal terms, 
which may shame companies and the local governments that subsidize 
them into better behavior. If minorities participate to a high degree in 
such movements, it may explain why Reese (1998) fi nds that the larger 
the minority presence in a municipality, the more likely it was to in-
clude contractual requirements of community benefi ts. 
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Even if a municipality has bargaining leverage (e.g., due to a scar-
city of developable sites and concomitant market appeal), there must be 
opportunities for exploiting this bargaining advantage. Such opportuni-
ties arise only when government and business engage in specifi c politi-
cal processes to coordinate interests on specifi c matters of public policy 
(Kantor 2002; Elkins 1995). For example, wealthy residential suburbs 
may not craft ideal deals because they have little available land for new 
commercial or industrial development and wish to maintain their com-
munity’s exclusivity. No deals would come to the table so there would 
be no opportunity to use the leverage that the suburb would, in all likeli-
hood, possess.
Ideal deal-making is likely to arise out of what economists call “re-
peated games”—similar experiences that build staff’s negotiation skills, 
spur community activism around these issues, and lead to ordinances 
and statutes that expressly require such mechanisms. This is one of the 
reasons why larger cities and states (with better-paid staff and more 
use of sophisticated planning and decision analysis techniques) tend to 
be better negotiators. Competing with larger cities may induce smaller 
places in the metro area to mimic their good behavior. One study found 
that the more strategic municipalities were located in close proximity 
to cities of similar sizes or were suburbs of a central city (Reese 1998). 
In contrast, depopulated, low-tax, rural areas have been known to give 
away the store to lure branch plants. 
Local governments comprise part of the distinctive civic cultures of 
economic development. Some adopt ideal deal structures because they 
are in keeping with a broader “good government” culture that respects 
values such as transparency and accountability. Others adopt better 
deal structures because they are desperate for anything that promises 
short-term outcomes and willing to try anything and everything (i.e, the 
“shoot anything that fl ies” approach). Reese and Rosenfeld (2001) note 
the importance of differentiating between these two motivations.
Empirical studies have found the use of accountability mechanisms 
more prevalent on the West Coast and in the Northeast (Elkins 1995; 
Reese 1998), but that their use cuts across political persuasions. Some 
of the most conservative, pro-business local regimes have passed the 
most stringent laws requiring the use of these contractual safeguards. In 
Indianapolis, for example, it was Republican mayor Stephen Goldsmith 
who insisted that all new jobs pay at least 90 percent of the area aver-
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age wage level in order to qualify for property tax assistance, and the 
city has a reputation for auditing fi rms and enforcing clawbacks (We-
ber 2002). In 1996 alone, the Indianapolis Metropolitan Development 
Commission cancelled tax abatements to fi ve companies who failed to 
live up to their pledges of job creation (Phillips 1996). Ideal dealmaking 
is not, apparently, politically partisan.
CONCLUSION
Without empirical research it is diffi cult to determine which spe-
cifi c factors will predict which political jurisdictions negotiate better 
deals. It is also diffi cult to examine whether ideal deals actually lead 
to ideal outcomes. Although using performance standards is certainly 
better than giving away subsidies for free, local governments still draft 
contracts too loosely and enforce them too weakly to get the most from 
their public investments (Weber 2002).
Often economic development practitioners give up before they start. 
They fi gure that even when they write comprehensive contracts, there is 
no guarantee that businesses will stick by their promises. Indeed, public 
offi cials have the power to bargain and persuade, to make concessions, 
provide incentives and reduce or eliminate local taxes or restrictions, 
but they do not have the power to compel businesses to move into or 
remain in the jurisdiction. Drafting contracts takes place within a larger 
context of suburban, regional, and international competition for busi-
ness and the context in which it operates has become increasingly un-
stable and unpredictable. 
This fact, however, is no excuse for being a poor negotiator. Spe-
cialized real estate investments can help embed footloose fi rms in the 
locality and create spillover benefi ts in terms of jobs, additional invest-
ments, and tax revenues. Indeed, sunk costs may be able to soften the 
market pressure fi rms feel to traverse the globe in search of the cheapest 
factors of production. However, the irony is that the more the public 
sector subsidizes those sunk costs and effectively absorbs part of the 
development expenses, the less fi rms have fi nancially at stake in their 
own investment decisions. Public risk bearing allows fi rms to be more, 
not less, mobile. A recent survey by Site Selection magazine found that 
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since 1996, corporate migration within the United States “has soared, 
roughly doubling to more than 11,000 moves a year” (cited in Uchitelle 
2000). Widespread use of business attractive incentives has no doubt 
contributed to some of this movement. 
Better public use of these tools, especially a reliance on more per-
formance-based incentives and legal protections to govern breach, 
remedies, and damages if businesses do not perform as promised, may 
give businesses pause before they consider yet another corporate relo-
cation. But these contractual provisions will only be effective if more 
municipalities and states adopt them as routine operating practice. If all 
governments raise standards in a coordinated manner, accountability 
mechanisms will not hamper the ability of individual governments to 
“bid for business”—a habit that has proven hard to break although one 
whose implementation still needs improvement. 
Notes
 1. This chapter focuses on those incentives that are negotiated on a case-by-case ba-
sis at the discretion of the local government. Other kinds of programs, sometimes 
called “statutory” incentives, are offered “as a right” if a business meets certain 
preset eligibility requirements. An example of the latter case is an investment 
tax credit program that allows any business that meets eligibility requirements 
to deduct a certain amount from its annual income tax bill. In such a case, no 
negotiation is necessary.
  2. Of course, public agencies must often be reminded of their responsibility to serve 
wider, public interests—a role that interest groups, fi scal watchdogs, and com-
munity organizations take on.
  3. Parts of this section are based on a handbook for state and local offi cials, The 
Ideal Deal: How Local Governments Can Get More for Their Economic Devel-
opment Dollar (Weber and Santacroce forthcoming).
  4. “Ideal deals,” as they are labeled in this chapter, closely resemble what other 
authors have referred to as “Type II developmental strategies” or “programs in 
which local jurisdictions require private developers to provide a service or public 
benefi t in exchange for development rights” (Goetz 1990, p. 171; see also Elkins 
1995).
  5. Minnesota Statutes 116J.994.
 6. Connecticut Development Authority, Master Guarantee Agreement, Participa-
tory Loan Program 1995. See also Connecticut Public Act No. 93: 218.
  7. In a recent interview in Site Selection Magazine, a vice president of Toyota de-
nied that states and cities with accountability mechanisms were “crossed off” 
the list of possible plant locations (Bruns 2004). He advised, “If you’re going to 
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use clawbacks, put them in up front. Don’t put them in at the last minute, when 
you think you have a deal and all of a sudden the lawyers get involved with all 
these clawbacks nobody talked about. The problem with clawbacks is . . . (i)t’s 
just another bureaucracy to deal with. But I understand why states sometimes use 
them—with some companies you’re not sure of their history and can’t test their 
track record.”
 8. Scholars have long questioned just how much leverage subsidies provide given 
that they often comprise a small percentage of total relocation and start-up costs 
(Fisher and Peters 1998).
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